Showing posts with label energy drink. Show all posts
Showing posts with label energy drink. Show all posts

Sunday, May 2, 2021

Celsius Holdings Inc. (CELH) Valuation

I had originally intended this article to be a survey of the remaining large companies in the soft drink beverages industry, combining a short quantitative analysis of each side-by-side. When I looked at Celsius, however, I found more of a story than I expected, so this article will focus on CELH, with the survey coming up in the next article.

Going by their capsule description, Celsius develops and markets fitness and energy beverages sweetened with sucralose and avoiding corn syrup, using ingredients such as green tea (EGCG), ginger, calcium, chromium, B vitamins and vitamin C. Product graphics use a white-background, clean design that by appearance are aimed at nutrition- and health-conscious customers. It outsources its manufacturing process, which for some products includes carbonation. Product flavors include orange, wild berry, cola, green tea, raspberry, acai, peach, mango, jackfruit, blueberry, and pomegranate. Products sold in 12-ounce cans and in powdered form, though cans probably dominate the sales mix. 

Though CELH has a mid-size market capitalization, it has a small cap revenue, $131 million in 2020. The company web site is investor-oriented, with scant information about products and highly-polished, buzzword-filled descriptions of the company and management. It is more like a resume than a selling site.  Tellingly, the company has a code of ethics, which they will disclose to you if you make a request in writing. From the management page we learn about the CEO's "accelerated career" and "proven track record":

In his current role as CEO, Fieldly uses his strong background in financial leadership and operational expertise to focus on to maximize resources to drive revenue, corporate efficiencies, and shareholder value.

They are somewhat dependent on specialized distribution opportunities. For example, sales via Amazon were 12.0% and 15.1% of total revenue in 2019 and 2020. They have some distribution in Scandanavia, and a small amount of sales in SE Asia.

One advertising tag line they use is "live fit". A search for "celsius drink" will turn up a lot of sponsored ads within Amazon's site. The sponsored video I saw was of people working out in athletic gear at a gym (and drinking Celsius) with a pulsing, energetic synthesizer-based soundtrack. Overall, their drinks fit between the functional sports and weight control/nutritionals categories. They claim calorie-burning properties for some of their drinks, which they back with academic studies and papers conducted at universities.

Most of the data for this article was taken directly from the 2020 10K. (All annual reports here.)

CELH Valuation

Most of the shares of beverage companies covered here in the past few months were trading not far from their calculated valuation. In this case, the calculated value and stock price are significantly different. 

scenariobase EPSgrow rategrow dura.growth rate from peakdura. of post peakdisc rateshare value
pessimistic$0.102%10-8%85%$1.20
optimistic$0.1014%14-4%105%$4.73
nominal$0.108%12-5%105%$2.29
hot product$0.1125%7-8%145%$3.86
unbeliev.$0.1140%10-3%105%$20.31
2025 bill$$1.358%10-7%105%$25.54

The first possibility is that investors are looking at the 2019 revenues ($75M) and 2020 revenues ($131M), and assuming that the 75% revenue growth can continue. The line "unbelievable" in the table shows this scenario. CELH's 4/30/21 closing price was $57.30, more than ten times the most optimistic value. In February of 2020 CELH traded about $6, and this was not far from the $3 to $5 range it traded for 2018 and 2019. Since COVID, CELH has advanced ~10x in price, a move inspired by revenue growth, but not actually supported by the numbers actually posted. What is going on?

If you look at price targets of securities analysts, they are moving with the market. Three analysts cover CELH: Jeff Van Sinderen of B.Riley Financial, Jeffrey Cohen of Ladenburg Thalmann & Co., and Anthony Vendetti of Maxim Group. Average price target is $59.42. But since their reports were not available, we need to dig further.

What if we look at the potential eventual market size? Suppose Celsius grows to a billion dollar business? Are we in the right ballpark? It would seem so, from this Beverage Industry report on functional sports drinks. Total size of the protein et al market was $4B in 2020, while it is plausible that CELH could grow to some reasonable fraction of this size, say 15% to 25%.

So if we assume that Celsius can grow from $131M in 2020 to $1B by 2025, increase its net margin to 10%, and refrain from share count expansion, then the value of the company is shown in the "2025 bill$" line of the valuation table, or $25. This too falls short of the current market price.

There are some reasons to be skeptical of all of these valuations. Celsius has lost money over most of its lifetime (values are from Macro Trends; values except EPS are in millions):

reve-
nue
oper incomenet incomeoper marginnet marginshrsEPS
2020$131$8$96.1%6.9%74$0.11
2019$75-$1$10-1.3%13.3%64$0.16
2018$53-$11-$11-20.8%-20.8%50-$0.23
2017$36-$8-$9-22.2%-25.0%44-$0.19
2016$23-$3-$3-13.0%-13.0%39-$0.09
2015$17-$2-$3-11.8%-17.6%33-$0.08
2014$15-$2-$2-13.3%-13.3%20-$0.10

Some recent revenue growth is from acquisitions, hence not all of the revenue growth is organic:

As a result of completion of the acquisition of Func Food in October 2019, we acquired the beverages, protein bars, supplements and superfoods marketed and distributed in Finland, Sweden,and Norway. These products are distributed under the FAST, FitFarm and Coco Vi brands and which are owned by Func Food. FAST products is a market leader in Finland and has begun distribution into the Swedish market. FitFarm and Coco Vi are well-established brands of superfoods and other supplements in the Nordic countries.

Share counts are unlikely to remain constant. Management has been given incentive programs that would result in share dilution, and these programs are not of a modest size, about 5.2 million shares at the moment. 

Corporate History as an Indicator

Sometimes the provenance of a company indicates its underlying philosophy. Quoting from the 2020 10K:

We were incorporated in Nevada on April 26, 2005 under the name “Vector Ventures, Inc.” and originally engaged in mineral exploration. Such business was unsuccessful. On January 26, 2007, we acquired the Celsius® beverage business of Elite FX, Inc., a Florida corporation engaged in the development of“functional” beverages since 2004 in a reverse merger, and subsequently changed our name to Celsius Holdings, Inc.

Celsius is also engaged in building reputation through clinical studies, which it funds:

We have funded seven U.S. based clinical studies for Celsius®. Each was conducted by a research organization and each studied the total Celsius®formula. The first study was conducted by the Ohio Research Group of Exercise Science & Sports Nutrition. The remaining studies were conducted by the Applied Biochemistry & Molecular Physiology Laboratory of the University of Oklahoma. 

All of these studies were completed over 10 years ago, so the resulting data is not new. Although the research was conducted by a university, it was paid for by Celsius and to my knowledge not replicated elsewhere. 

Insider Opinions

Investors have put in about $159,884,154, the paid in capital line on the balance sheet. Against this, the company has so far accumulated lifetime net losses of $55,426,832. With 74 million shares, even when CELH was at $4 the investors (as a group) were ahead, with a market cap of $300 million.

A small group of people own 57.1% of CELH. Officers and directors own another 18.8%. Together they own 75.9%. It's been a good investment for them, though they have been funding it for perhaps five to ten years, and so they have had to be patient.

Going by insider sales records, the major holders of CELH can't believe their good fortune, and took profits at prices far lower than the current trading price. Carl DeSantis sold 720,784 shares 8/25/20 at $21.30, and then sold 459,054 shares on 11/24/20 at about $31 per share.

These prices are remarkably close to the last two valuation lines in our table above. (For any long term valuation, which is very volatile because of the long time periods and unknown growth rates to come, $25 and $31 are close enough together that one can essentially think of them as the "same".) Did the primary insiders have a "reserve price" in mind based on ultimate company revenue plans, and did the stock price meet these reserve prices in 2020? If so, we might see additional moderate sales in the next few months, though an insider in CELH might also be hoping to sell the company to a PEP or KO at some point, for an even larger payoff.

Your Decision: Sell or Avoid, Unless

CELH is traded over twice its present long term value. With only 24.1% of the shares floated, CELH is likely hard to borrow and subject to short squeezes. If you don't own it, I can see no reason to pay up for it. If you do, it's in speculative territory, and over the long term more likely to decline to $25 than to rise to $100. Of course, these decisions depend on the product. Do you drink Celsius, and therefore understand its fundamental value to people? Are you a regular buyer? Is it a compelling value over other functional sports and weight loss drinks? If you have this kind of "inside info" you can refine our valuation further.

Would it be an attractive takeover candidate for KO or PEP? At the moment, it is not yet ready for that kind of acquisition, and it's already priced as though it were. If I were the KO CEO, I'd be leery of paying such a huge premium for so little revenue. Any acquisition would need to be at least a doubling of revenue further into the future.

Tuesday, March 30, 2021

Monster Beverage Corp. (MNST) Valuation

Monster Company History

Starting as Hansen's in 1935, the history of Monster involves a kind of change of identity. It was a small regional company when it was bought by Rodney Sacks in 1992. After initiatives in 1996 and 1997 to create a competitor to Red Bull didn't sell as well as they liked, in 2002 they developed an energy drink they called Monster, and it took off, far beyond the success of their legacy soda business. In 2012 Hansen's changed its name to Monster. In 2015, Coca-Cola took over the legacy Hansen's soda and juice business and folded it into their VEB (Venture and Emerging Brands) business unit, in exchange for distributing the Monster product portfolio and making an equity investment in Monster. 

Monster is not the leading energy drink brand, as Red Bull has that distinction. Monster Energy and Monster Energy Zero Ultra have 15% and 5.8% of the U.S. energy drink market, according to Statista. Monster is distinct in the large size of its standard retail unit compared with Red Bull, something that hasn't changed since the emergence of the energy drink market. In the U.S. Rockstar, bought by PepsiCo in 2020, is third in market share.

Your Own Monster Research

If you don't already drink Monster or don't want to sample it, reading issues of The Red Bulletin magazine might help you get into the head of the target market (or at least what Red Bull thinks it is). Those outside the U.S. may have better insight into how well marketing and distribution efforts are working, since the U.S. market, though not saturated, is more mature, and the best growth opportunities are in non-U.S. markets, such as China.

Monster Beverage Corp's web site is very well done and straightforward. You will find full information on brands, press releases, earnings webcasts, investor event presentations, SEC filings and periodic financial reports, and insight into corporate governance. The brands links will take you to consumer-oriented product sites.

Financial History

Data is from Macro Trends. Amounts are in millions of U.S. dollars. Shares are in millions. 

YearRevenueOper Incomeoper marginNet Incomenet margin
2020$4,599$1,63336%$1,41030.7%
2019$4,201$1,40333%$1,10826.4%
2018$3,807$1,28434%$99326.1%
2017$3,369$1,19936%$82124.4%
2016$3,049$1,08536%$71323.4%
2015$2,723$89433%$54720.1%
2014$2,465$74830%$48319.6%
2013$2,246$57326%$33915.1%
2012$2,061$55127%$34016.5%
2011$1,703$45627%$28616.8%
2010$1,304$34827%$21216.3%
2009$1,143$33729%$20918.3%
2008$1,034$16416%$10810.4%
2007$904$23126%$14916.5%
2006$606$15926%$9816.2%
2005$349$10330%$6318.1%

Revenue is growing in recent years at about 10%. Operating and net income margins are excellent. It is notable that revenue grew about 9% in 2020 and earnings 27%, unlike KO, which saw significant reductions in revenue, and PEP, which had a slight shrinkage in earnings. Margins have increased over the past 15 years and Monster appears to be enjoying efficiencies at its current scale. Its margins compare well with those of KO and PEP.

YearSharesEPSShare Holder EquityROEshare shrink agebook value
2020535$2.64$5,16127.3%2.19%$9.65
2019547$2.03$4,17126.6%3.01%$7.63
2018564$1.76$3,61127.5%2.25%$6.40
2017577$1.42$3,89521.1%3.83%$6.75
2016600$1.19$3,33021.4%-3.81%$5.55
2015578$0.95$4,80911.4%-10.52%$8.32
2014523$0.92$1,51531.9%-0.58%$2.90
2013520$0.65$99234.2%5.28%$1.91
2012549$0.62$64452.8%1.96%$1.17
2011560$0.51$97929.2%-0.36%$1.75
2010558$0.38$82825.6%1.76%$1.48
2009568$0.37$58535.7%2.91%$1.03
2008585$0.19$43624.8%1.35%$0.75
2007593$0.25$42235.3%-0.17%$0.71
2006592$0.17$22543.6%-1.54%$0.38
2005583$0.11$12650.0%$0.22
average ROE
31.1%
std dev of ROE
10.8%
total shrinkage
8.23%
annualized shrinkage
0.57%

MNST is buying back shares at a rapid pace. Despite the injection of capital by KO in 2015 and bump in shares issued to KO, MNST has a net reduction of shares over the past 15 years, and in the last four years has been using cash to buy back two to four percent of their shares each year. Since MNST doesn't pay a dividend, this is presently the only way MNST returns excess earnings to shareholders.

The ROE record seems to indicate that MNST still has too much cash on hand, and is capable of operating on a leaner capital structure than it does presently. Since paying a PE of 36 for your own shares is a mixed blessing, perhaps a reluctance to part with too much cash is a sign of management prudence. 

Year7 yr rev growth7 yr net income growth7 yr EPS growth
202010.8%22.6%22.2%
201910.7%18.4%18.5%
201812.2%19.5%19.4%
201714.5%21.3%20.7%
201615.0%19.2%18.2%
201514.8%26.1%25.8%
201415.4%18.3%20.5%
201320.6%19.4%21.1%
201228.9%27.2%28.0%

This table shows seven year moving averages of revenue and earnings growth. Previously torrential growth has calmed somewhat, but, as hinted before, MNST is enjoying efficiencies of scale that have resulted in earnings continuing to grow faster than sales. 

Valuation

I haven't said it before in this blog, but it feels like I'm repeating myself to say that getting an estimate of the long term earnings growth rate is critical to calculating what MNST is worth. At a basic PE of about 36, MNST is expensive if is growing at the analyst consensus rate of 9%. That PE would be appropriate for a company growing at 20%, but it's not doing that anymore. True, there are two stories to MNST: its U.S. growth rate (perhaps 7%), and expectations of international growth of 16 to 20%.

I looked at four scenarios:  pessimistic, optimistic, nominal, and consensus growth rates. All use a discount rate of 5%, but assume different growth periods, peak EPS, and different decline periods. For comparison, two variants that use a 3% discount rate representing an extended period of low inflation and low national economic growth are included as well.

scenariobase EPSgrowth rategrowth dura.growth rate from peakdura. of post peakdisc rateshare value
pessimistic$2.6410%10-7%105%$57
optimistic$2.6415%15-4%155%$169
nominal$2.6410%15-5%125%$93
consensus$2.649%12-5%165%$72
optim, mal$2.6413%15-4%153%$183
nomin, mal$2.648%15-5%123%$98

To believe the optimistic scenario, you need to believe that international sales of Monster Energy and similar drinks will take off like the U.S. introduction of Monster did. To be somewhat sure of that belief, you will need to be there in perhaps a dozen different countries and experience the marketing and consumer take-up, on the spot. I don't have that data, so I can't recommend that scenario as the right one.

The pessimistic scenario doesn't change the growth rate much. Rather, it is comprises a short duration of growth, followed by a more rapid contraction of the business (or at least of EPS) ten years hence. I think MNST is better than that, but it's worth keeping in mind.

The nominal case nearly matches the current stock price, and it's a relatively modest set of assumptions for growth and duration. Does that mean MNST is fully valued, and should be sold? No. One year from now, EPS could be 10% higher, and if we re-do the valuation from that higher level and with the benefit of another year's wisdom, we might find that the prospective valuation at that moment is 10% higher. So there is some reason to expect that paying nearly full price now may still return 10% over short to medium periods in capital appreciation alone.

The consensus case has a slightly lower growth rate, a lower growth duration, but a longer lifetime post-peak. I think this shows that the market is likely already leaning into MNST's bullish case, and actual investor expectations are for more than 9% growth. I have right now one sell side report that uses a higher growth rate, for example.